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transform from one to another, the physical motion of a thing changes into
a physiological motion in our senses. Then the physiological motion
changes into the psychological motion of the idea. To begin with such
changes are not admissible, and even if they be admitted it means that
Marxism does not succeed in revealing the relation between a thing and its
idea except as a relation between a cause and its effect or at the most
that of a reality and its reflected picture.But why should we assume that this effect and cause
differ from other effects and causes and are distinguished from them by a
special characteristic, namely that the effect pictures its cause
faithfully? Of course, there are many physiological events that are
effects of external causes without having the capacity of picturing their
causes. Even if such a thing were admitted, how do we know that the idea
(percept) fully corresponds to the objective reality?The Marxists answer this objection by asserting that
thought is a part and product of nature; rather its highest expression.
Our knowledge is nothing other than a superior product of nature; it
cannot but reflect the laws of the motions of matter. The products of
thought, being the products of nature, are not in contradiction but in
agreement with the rest of material nature.Yet this is not sufficient for proving the possibility of
knowledge. Aren't idealist thought and theological and metaphysical
thought as much part of nature and products of it as dialectical
materialism?
Truth and Dialectical Movement of
Thought:
Marxism rejected the relativity theory of truth as a kind
of sophistry, but it itself admitted relativity by asserting that:(1) there are no absolute truths; truth grows and
develops in a way that reflects the growth and development of external
reality.(2) truth and falsehood may come together; there is no
absolute incompatibility between truth and falsity as asserted by formal
logic;(3) all judgements, regardless of how truthful they may appear,
involve contradiction and hence an aspect of falsity. It is such a
contradiction that makes knowledge and truth grow. Al-Sadr now proceeds to
refute each of these notions. Truth, according to realism, is an idea that corresponds
to a reality that exists independently of mind and consciousness. There is
a second definition of 'truth' given by subjective relativists, according
to which it is something which is consistent with the mind's formulations.
The third definition of truth, advanced by the pragmatists and
instrumentalists, is that it is some idea whose benefit or utility is
demonstrated by practical experience. Bergson described truth as a
creation not discovery.Schiller and Dewey proposed nearly similar definitions of
truth. Pragmatism involves a clear contusion between the meaning of truth
and the motives behind attempts to attain it. Moreover.(1) to give truth a pure practical meaning and to strip
it of the quality of disclosing independent reality is an unrestricted
admission of skepticism;(2) secondly, it is not clear whether the
benefit of individual or that of society is to be the criterion of truth.
It the criterion is the former, it would lead to a social chaos. It the
latter, a long social experience is required to affirm the validity of any
statement. This would apply to the pragmatic doctrine itself, whose truth
cannot be determined without the test of experience. (3) That an idea
is beneficial is not sufficient for its acceptance. For instance, a
disbeliever cannot accept religion even it he agrees that it is effective
in rectifying human conduct.If Marxism is to assert the possibility of knowledge, it
cannot do so without adopting the correspondence theory of truth on which
realism rests. For it is impossible on the basis of this theory to hold
that truth develops and grows. Marxism understands neither motion nor
truth when it holds that truth is subject to movement, and motion and
becoming involve contradiction.In the description of a process involving motion, change
or becoming, a statement describing a certain momentary state is
absolutely true at that moment; it cannot, after that, become contrary to
that reality at that specific stage.Moreover, Marxism abolishes itself by applying the law of
movement to truth. It movement is a general law governing truths, then it
is impossible to affirm any absolute truth, including the judgements of
logic and mathematics, to say nothing of the doctrine of dialectical
materialism itself.Marxism finds fault with formal logic for accepting
absolute opposition between truth and falsity. The Marxist notion of the
union of truth and falsity is based on two misconceptions. One of them is
the notion of the development and movement of truth and the other is that
motion is nothing but a series of contradictions. The author postpones the
study of the second issue to Part 2 of this work. Nevertheless, it is
evident even at this stage of the argument that application of the laws of
the dialectic to the realm of knowledge undermines the foundations of all
rational knowledge.Science and Absolute Truth: Al-Sadr cites here an
argument of Engels wherein the latter criticizes the principle that truth
is absolutely incompatible with falsehood. Engels cites the example of a
general scientific law (Boyle's law) which is not true in certain cases to
assert that if the metaphysicians were correct in their assertion that
truths are absolute and totally incompatible with falsity, then they would
have to reject every scientific law because it is not true in some cases.
Al-Sadr points out that Engels does not understand well the phrase
'absolute truth'. He explains that propositions are of two types: simple
(e.g. 'Plato died before Aristotle') and composite (e.g. 'Bodies expand by
heat'). A simple proposition cannot be true in one respect and false in
another. But since a composite proposition is really a bundle of numerous
simple propositions, it is true in some cases and false in other. But this
does not mean that truth and falsity unite. A composite proposition is
completely true in the case that it is true, and completely false in the
case that it is false.Following conclusions are derived from this study:1.
Truth is absolute and unprogressive, even though the objective reality
develops and changes.2. Truth is fully incompatible with falsity. A
simple proposition cannot be both true and false.3. The application of
dialectic to truth leads to complete skepticism.By regarding truth as
in continuous change and development, the dialectic sentences itself to
death.The Marxist Relapse into Subjectivism: Despite claiming
an objective character for its own relativism, Marxism relapses into
subjective relativism by linking consciousness with class. Although this
is class subjectivity, and not the individual subjectivity of subjective
relativists, no one can secure in its light the truth of any philosophical
or scientific judgement in the sense of its correspondence to objective
reality. As long as Marxism upholds the necessity of class character, it
cannot offer a world view of universal validity. (Here Part 1 ends).Here at the conclusion of the summary of Part I of Our
Philosophy, some relevant remarks may not be out of place. It is true that
Marx, Freud and the Behaviourists are wrong in regarding the economic
factor or the urges of the unconscious or the physiological factors as the
exclusive determinant of thought and consciousness but it would also be
wrong to refuse to acknowledge the influence, no matter how undesirable,
of these factors on consciousness and thought. The history of human
thought, more than being a history of intellectual health, is an account
of monstrous perversions and deviations. Correct, clear and healthy
thinking has been and remains an exception rather than the rule.In this regard, the Holy Quran, also, refers to the role
of tradition and desire (ahwa') in deviating men from the course of
true intellection, and considers ethnic, social, political and economic
factors as the causes behind social conflict, division and diversity. To
recognize the causes which lie behind deviant thought is as important as
the necessity of defending the value of human knowledge. And perhaps it is
only after we have fully recognized these deviating factors that we can
fully appreciate the possibility of certain knowledge.
