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The next step is that of ordering of information, inference and
application.It does not accept that some knowledge is independent of
sense experience. Denying that there exists some primary knowledge which
enables the mind to move from the first to the second stage, it fails to
explain how the mind can move from the stage of sense perception to that
of theory and inference.The conclusion is- drawn that only the rationalist theory
provides an adequate explanation of how the mind is able to move from the
first to the second stage of knowledge. It is only the knowledge of the
general rational laws that affords the scientist to develop theories and
to draw inferences in his endeavour to discover the reality that lies
beyond empirical phenomena. The rejection of primary rational knowledge,
which is independent of experience, makes it impossible to go beyond the
stage of sense-perception.
Empiricism and the Possibility of
metaphysics:
Before the birth of empiricism, philosophy was considered
responsible for discovering the general laws of being. Its tool was
syllogistic reasoning and philosophic thought moved from general to more
particular propositions. Not only metaphysics and ethics but also such
sciences as physics and psychology lay within the sphere of philosophy.
However, the experimental method and induction took the sciences, each of
them devoted to a specific class of phenomena, out of the purview of
philosophy, which was left to deal with issues which fell within the
purview of pure reason. The empiricists claimed that there is no field of
knowledge beyond the field of experimentation that the sciences have
divided among themselves, leaving nothing for philosophy. The only scope
that was admitted for philosophy by some schools was that of discovering
the relations and links among the sciences and to postulate general
scientific theories based on the outcome of experiments in various
scientific fields. Foremost amongst them were the schools of Marxism and
positivism.The logical positivists were not satisfied with the
empiricist attacks against metaphysics. They did not limit themselves, for
instance, to the assertion that metaphysics was useless since its
propositions could not be demonstrated by the scientific method. The
positivists went on to assert that the propositions of metaphysics were
meaningless. The criticism of the positivists against metaphysics can be
summarized as follows:1. metaphysical propositions deal with matters that lie
beyond the sphere of experience and experiment. Hence they cannot be
verified.2. Their being true or false makes no difference so far as
the world of experience is concerned.3. metaphysical propositions are
meaningless because they do not give any information about the
world.4. It is inappropriate to ascribe truth or falsity to them.The author suggests the following lines for answering
this criticism:1. If we refute the empirical theory of knowledge and
affirm the existence of a primary knowledge prior to experience in the
core of the human mind, we can demonstrate that the mind has the capacity
to confirm the veracity or falsity of metaphysical propositions.2.
Although metaphysical propositions have no direct bearing on the data of
experience, these data are not altogether irrelevant to metaphysical
statements. Further clarification to be given later.3. The logical
positivists describe a proposition as 'meaningful' if its truth or falsity
can be affirmed within the limits of sense experience.This is equal to saying, "The content of metaphysical
propositions lies beyond sense experience". With this, the positivists
assert an indisputable truth, that the subjects of metaphysics are not
empirical something which the rationalists have stressed all along.What would the positivist say about such propositions as
relate to nature but cannot be verified by sense experience, such as a
statement about the existence of mountains and valleys on the other side
of the moon? Positivism revises its original position to assert that that
which is important here is logical possibility, not actual possibility.
However, the notion of logical possibility is a metaphysical notion, and
thus positivism, in the last analysis, has to adopt a metaphysical
criterion of 'meaning'. metaphysical propositions are as meaningful as any
other, in that they relate to realities independent of the mind and the
logical possibility of being true or false holds in their case.
Marxism and metaphysics:
The Marxist position regarding metaphysics is essentially
similar to that of positivism. Marxism rejects a higher philosophy above
and over the sciences and independent of them. Marxist philosophy calls
itself 'scientific', yet soon trespasses into other fields to judge
metaphysical issues affirmatively or negatively. In violating its self-set
limits it contradicts itself a result of the Marxist mistake of basing its
theory of knowledge on sense experience alone.It is in the light of the rational theory of knowledge
that philosophy and metaphysics rest on firm fundamental principles. The
acceptance of primary rational knowledge relieves philosophy of bondage to
the constantly changing theories of experimental science.The link between philosophy and science is strong, for
science furnishes philosophy with new facts that enable philosophy to
obtain new philosophical conclusions. Yet in spite of this philosophy may
at times not need any sense experience, nor is it necessary for philosophy
to accompany the procession of science in its gradual march.The Value of Knowledge (Chapter
2):
The Possibility of
Knowledge:
In this chapter Martyr al-Sadr is concerned not with the
'value' of knowledge but rather with the possibility of knowledge as such.
To what extent does 'knowledge' (i.e. that which is considered to be
knowledge) capture the essence of reality and the secrets of the external
world?Marxism believes in the possibility of knowledge of
objective realities and rejects skepticism and sophistry. The world does
not contain anything that cannot be known. But is it appropriate for
Marxism to claim that definite knowledge is possible? Can it escape
skepticism in the ultimate analysis?In order to understand the Marxist and Islamic positions
on this issue, the author considers it essential to review important
doctrines formulated by philosophers, beginning with the Sophists.Greek Philosophy: In the fifth century B.C. a class of
teachers emerged in Greece that devoted itself to teaching of rhetoric and
giving professional advice to their clients in matters of law, court
procedure and politics. Protagoras (b.c. 500 B.C.) and Gorgias (fl.c. 427
B.C.), two major skeptics, were the products of this class. Gorgias, for
instance, taught that the Real, about which the pre-Socratic philosophers
had argued, does not exist. If a world-stuff existed we could never know
what it was like; it is not what it appears, since the senses lie. Even if
Reality could be known, knowledge is incommunicable; for, language, being
mere noise, cannot convey the knowledge of reality to other minds.The Sophists rejected the possibility of knowledge and
made truth a purely subjective and relative affair. Hence metaphysics is
idle speculation and its results are worthless. There is no reality that
reason can know except the ever-changing flux of sensible experience.Sophistry wished to destroy what philosophy had built
hitherto. They were opposed by Socrates (d.399 B.C.), Plato (428-347 B.C.)
and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), who tried to maintain reason on its throne.
Aristotelian epistemology validated reason and recognized the value of
experience, and posited the possibility of certain knowledge.The skepticism that reemerged after Aristotle was a
compromise in that it did not deny reality but denied the possibility of
certain knowledge. However, skepticism could not prevail in philosophy,
and reason mounted the throne offered to it by Aristotle, until skepticism
emerged again in the 16th century in an atmosphere of doubt and rebellion
against the authority of reason. Descartes emerged in this atmosphere and
he tried to bring back certitude to philosophy.Descartes: Descartes (1596-1650) began his philosophy
with sweeping doubt. Ideas, he reasoned are susceptible to error and sense
perception is often deceptive. The point of departure for philosophical
certitude was the existence of his thoughts, which leads him to infer his
own existence: 'I think, therefore, I am'. This statement is true because
it is clear and distinct. He therefore adopts as a general rule the
principle that all things that we conceive very clearly and distinctly are
true.Ideas seem to be of three sorts: (1) those that are innate, (2)
those that are foreign and come from without, (3) those that are the
mind's constructs. Descartes disposes of skepticism by first proving the
existence of God, whose idea belongs to the first class. Since we as
imperfect beings are not sufficient reason for the idea of perfection we
entertain the idea of God being the idea of an absolutely perfect being
the idea of God must have been caused by Him. God is thus the first
objective reality posited by Descartes. Now since God is good, the innate
ideas (which include the ideas of external bodies) which we have such
strong inclination to believe must be true. This is how Descartes posits
external reality and the possibility of science.Al-Sadr points out that 'I think, therefore, I am',
contains a concealed syllogism: 'I think, every thinker exists, therefore
I exist'.Moreover as pointed out by Ibn Sina, this argument from
thought to existence is invalid; for the thinking subject admits his
existence in the first phrase 'I think'.Secondly, Descartes confuses between the idea of a
perfect being and the objective reality it represents. It is God, not the
idea of God, which is more sublime than human beings.Descartes bases the whole edifice of existence on the
proposition:"It is impossible for God to deceive". He confuses
between 'deception is impossible', and 'deception is abominable', which is
not a metaphysical (judgement of fact) but an ethical (judgement of value)
proposition. In any case, the author's purpose is not an elaborate
criticism of Descartes' philosophy but to present his view regarding the
possibility of knowledge. Descartes accepts the validity of innate
rational knowledge.John Locke:
Locke (1632-1704) is the founder of modern empiricism.
While he claims that all knowledge is derived from experience there being
no innate ideas or principles he divides knowledge into three
types:(1) by intuition, (2) by rational demonstration, (3) by
sensation. Our knowledge of our own existence is intuitive, our knowledge
of God's existence is demonstrative, and our knowledge of things present
to sense is sensitive. This division of knowledge into three groups is
inconsistent with his empirical doctrine.Locke makes a distinction between what he calls primary
and secondary qualities. The primary ones are in separable from bodies,
such as solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number. The
secondary qualities are only in the percipient, such as colour, sound,
smell, etc.Since there is no way, according to Locke, of knowing the
primary qualities except through the senses, this division is also
inconsistent with his empirical doctrine.
The Idealists:
The Platonic theory of Ideas, generally called 'realism',
is referred to as 'idealism' by the author. Whatever we may call it, it
did not involve any denial or doubt about reality. In metaphysics,
idealism is the theory that reality is of the nature of mind or idea. To
al-Sadr, it is an attempt to shake the foundations of objective reality
and to exterminate certainty. In order to study the role of idealism in
the theory of knowledge, he proposes to examine three tendencies in
idealism. These he calls 'philosophical', 'physical' and
'physiological'.Philosophical Idealism: Its founder was Berkeley, who
declared, 'To exist is to know or to be known'. He denies existence to
objective realities existing independent of minds. Mind and its ideas
exist. All we know of 'matter' are the qualities of our sense (the
secondary qualities of Locke). Berkeley's idealism has been interpreted
differently and al-Sadr has selected an interpretation that he considers
best-known. He cites Berkeley's proofs in support of his doctrines.The first one is intended to prove that all knowledge is
based on and comes from the senses. The main criticism against Berkeley is
that he takes for granted the law of contradiction in his proofs while
denying that there is any knowledge not rooted in sense experience. The
author interprets Berkeley as denying the independent existence of things
and offers reasons for rejecting this alleged denial of Berkeley.The fact is that Berkeley's position is not understood
clearly by the author. Berkeley does not deny the reality of external
objects. What he denies is that such objects could exist by themselves and
independent of the Divine mind. That is, existence for him is synonymous
with being the object of consciousness. Things cannot exist except as
ideas inside minds. Why does Berkeley deny what Locke calls primary
qualities? That is because he is reluctant to recognize such qualities as
extension, number, motion, solidity and figure as being attributes of the
Divine mind, perhaps in accordance with the theological notions of the
scholastics. If external objects are to be conceived as ideas in the
Divine mind, there is no place for matter and materiality in the external
world, matter being the main obstacle in the way of conceiving external
objects as Divine ideas. Hence he denies the primary qualities as
representing attributes of material bodies, and thus he annihilates
matter. In some ways Berkeley's thesis that existence is mental is similar
to the theory of God's 'knowledge by presence' ('ilm huduri)
propounded by some Muslim philosophers. In both the cases; things are
conceived as objects of knowledge, not as things in themselves independent
of a perceiving mind. On the whole, one may say that the reasons behind
Berkeley's denial of matter and corporeality are mainly theological,
because he regards the idea of material substratum as the base on which
the concept of thing-in-itself rests. Since corporeality cannot be a
quality of Divine ideas, Berkeley will not have any things-in-themselves.
According to him everything that there is thing- in-consciousness.
The Nature of Judgement:
However, to return to al-Sadr's criticism of Berkeley, it
is obvious that Berkeley's denial of the objectivity of thought leads to
solipsism. Berkeley's proofs involve a misunderstanding of the nature of
knowledge. Knowledge has two main divisions according to al-Sadr:
conception and judgement. The forms of objects exist on three levels in
our intellect:(1) as percepts, on the level of sense perception, (2) as
images, on the level of imagination (and perhaps memory), and (3) as
concepts, on the abstract level of intellection. Mere concepts, in
isolation from one another, do not ensure the mind's movement from the
subjective to the objective realm. The presence of the form of an essence
in our intellect is one thing, while the objective presence of that
essence in the outside is something else (it is not clear whether this is
true of sense perception or only of imagination and conception).Judgement, however, is different from conception. It is
the point of departure for the movement from conception to
objectivity.1. Judgement does not arise in the mind by way of senses.
It is rather an act of the knowing mind.2. Most importantly, it is an
inherent property of judgement to reveal a reality beyond the mind.
Although the mind has no direct conjunction with anything except its
knowledge, it is inherent in judgement to be essentially disclosive
(kashfan dhatiyyan) of something outside knowledge.Berkeley's argument is based on a confusion between
conception and judgement. The empirical doctrine that all knowledge arises
from perception relates to the stage of conception. By failing to
recognize the difference between concepts and judgements, it makes it
impossible to move in the direction of objectivity.
Answers to Objections:
(1) It may be said that if it is inherent in judgement to
essentially disclose reality lying beyond knowledge, then all judgements
must be true, which is not the case. To solve this difficulty al-Sadr
explains the meaning of 'essential disclosure'. It is inherent in
judgement to point towards a reality independent of itself. Whether true
or false, it discloses judgement is not detached other than itself. Thus
essential disclosure of from judgement itself, even when there is error
and ambiguity (the author uses the word 'knowledge' instead of judgement
in this statement, which does not agree with the conception that knowledge
is something always true).(2) The second objection is that if judgement may be
erroneous, its property of essential disclosure being unable to protect it
from error, how can we rely upon it? The answer is that if human thought
did not possess a number of judgements of indubitable certainty, no
judgement would be free of doubt and it would be impossible for us to know
any reality. It is here that the doctrine of necessary primary knowledge
comes to our rescue. This doctrine asserts that there is a knowledge whose
truth is secure and which is completely free from error. Error occurs in
inferring secondary judgements on the basis of primary knowledge. Even
Berkeley unconsciously believes in a store of certain knowledge, for no
one can demonstrate anything unless he bases his demonstration on the
fundamentals contained in primary knowledge such as the law of
contradiction and the principle of causality and necessity.This discussion of philosophical idealism enables us to
draw two conclusions: (1) the acceptance of the essentially disclosing
nature of judgements, (2) the acceptance of basic principle of human
knowledge whose truth is necessarily secure. Even Berkeley's belief in the
existence of other minds and his proofs in favour of idealism assume the
acceptance of these two notions.Realism (which in metaphysics means that reality is not
reducible to mind and thought, and in epistemology means the doctrine that
objects of knowledge and experience exist independently of their being
known or experienced) bases its arguments on these two principles.
Idealism in Physics and
Psychology:
The nineteenth-century physicist explained nature in
terms of mechanical laws involving material bodies, particles and waves.
The developments in atomic physics abolished the classical conception of
matter. Matter was no more indestructible; mass and matter became
convertible to energy. As a result of this, the materialistic conception
of the world became inconsistent with the findings of empirical
