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Critique of Marxist Philosophy
Martyr Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr''sA Critical Summary of His Book Our Philosophy
by
Ali Quli Qara''i
Part 1
OUR PHILOSOPHY:
By Muhammad Baqir As-Sadr.
Translated
from the Arabic with an introduction and notes by Shams C. Inati. Foreword
by Sayyed Hossein Nasr. The Muhammadi Trust in association with KPI:
London and New York, 1987. Pp. xvii + 295, ISBN 0-7103 0179-0. Distributed
by Routledge & Kegan Paul, Associated Book Publishers (UK) Ltd., 11
New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 9 EE.
The present book was intended as first of a series that
remained incomplete due to al-Sadr''s martyrdom, which deprived the Islamic
world of one of its most original and able thinkers. This work, with
al-''Usus al-mantiqiyyah li al-''istiqra'' (The Logical Foundations of
Induction), makes up the author''s main contribution to contemporary Muslim
philosophic thought.
It consists of an introduction and two parts. The first
part deals with the theory of knowledge and the second with some problems
of metaphysics.
The Introduction:
The Social Problem:
Here the author spells out his main aim for writing the
book. It is not philosophy for philosophy''s sake. The purpose is to
present Islam as an alternative system superior to capitalism and secular
democracy on the one hand and to Marxism and socialism on the other.
Although devoid of an articulate worldview or ideology,
capitalistic democracies are materialistic to the core. Dissociating
themselves from all transcendental principles, they claim to promote the
interests and rights of the individual and safeguard his economic,
political liberties and freedom of expression and thought. The interests
of the individual are regarded as primary and are emphasized at the cost
of the interests of society. The assumption is that since all individuals
seek their interests, the provision of individual freedom leads to the
automatic fulfillment of the interests of society, which are regarded as
the sum of individual interests.
However, due to the dominant materialistic outlook on
life in capitalistic societies, the pursuit of individual self-interest
does not transcend the purview of materialism. Nearly all moral values,
most of which do not lie within the purview of materialistic self-seeking
of individuals, are neglected, causing deep harm to society''s welfare. The
rights of the minority are neglected. Unlimited economic freedom permits a
handful of capitalists to dominate the majority of people and to usurp
their freedoms and rights. With the immense economic resources at their
disposal, the wealthy capitalists take control of the mass media,
government, legislature and judiciary. Even foreign countries and peoples
are not secure from their greed for cheap raw materials, cheap labour, and
markets for finished products. Imperialism, hence, is a direct outcome of
capitalistic democracy.
In this dehumanizing hell of materialism and pursuit of
individual self-interest there is no place for love, mercy, self-denial or
any other higher human value.
Dialectical materialism sees all evils of capitalism to
be rooted in the institution of private property. If private property is
abolished and all property becomes public, passing from the possession and
control of the individual into those of the community, individual ambition
will die.
All will voluntarily pool the fruits of their labour for
the common benefit. The higher cultural values will be put within the
reach of all alike through community support and the diffusion of
education.
Although communism solved some of the problems of
capitalism at the cost of immense human suffering, the remedy was only
partial.
Dictatorship, repression, deprival of individual
freedoms, constant fear of imprisonment, torture and execution for the
dissidents, loss of economic vigour due to absence of individual
initiative and motivation, the debasement of man''s dignity these are some
of the outcomes of the socialist solution.
In the view of Martyr al-Sadr, the evil of capitalism
lies not in private property but in the neglect of the spiritual
dimensions of man''s being. Moreover, self-seeking is inherent in human
nature; it is not a product of the institution of private property, as
alleged by Marx. The failure of secular democracies lies in their emphasis
on individualism and their inability to stimulate and promote the higher
spiritual aspect of man''s self-seeking nature, whose activation is vital
for arising man''s altruistic potentialities so significant for society''s
welfare. Marxism makes the mistake of abolishing private property while
keeping intact capitalism''s destructive materialistic world view. As a
result, it ends up substituting a handful of bureaucrats and party
officials for a handful of capitalists who wield all power and control the
society''s wealth and resources.
Both capitalism and communism fail to present a correct
world outlook and to formulate an ideology capable of solving the diverse
problems of human society. This failure is rooted in their materialist
world view and their inadequate understanding of man''s nature.
The Islamic Solution:
There are no more than two alternatives for modern man to
solve the basic problem of society. Either, he should somehow abandon his
self-seeking character and become altruistic while keeping his
materialistic world view; or, he should abandon his materialistic outlook
and select a different metaphysical criterion and goal.
The communists select the first alternative because they
do not believe that man is self-seeking by nature. They erroneously regard
private property as infrastructure and man''s self-seeking as its
superstructure. This is putting the cart before the horse.
The second alternative is chosen by Islam. It does not
abolish private property but gives a new meaning to human existence. It
does not consider human nature a mechanical artifact of social and
economic conditions, nor does it put the society at the mercy of the
individual.
The Islamic outlook is based in faith in a transcendent
source of life and existence. This world is a prelude to another. The
highest value and criterion of all human activities and pursuits is the
attainment of God''s good pleasure and His approval. All human history
testifies to the innateness of man''s self-seeking character. Had it not
been for this self-seeking and self-love there would have been no motive
for the satisfaction of human needs. No school of thought or ideology can
offer an ultimate solution to man''s problems without taking into account
his nature and without establishing a harmony between that which is and
that which ought to be.
Offering a transcendental interpretation of life, a
perspective in which this world is a prelude to the hereafter, Islam seeks
to bring about a harmony between man''s self-seeking nature and the good of
society, by putting forward the criterion of the attainment of God''s
approval and good pleasure as the ultimate end in itself. As a result it
eliminates the conflict between the good of the individual and that of
society, and the individual is promised an everlasting reward in his
struggle for the establishment of a prosperous and just society as a means
for the attainment of God''s good pleasure:
Upon that day men shall issue in scatterings to see
their works, and whose has done an atom''s weight of good shall see it,
and whose has done an atom''s weight of evil shall see it.
(99:6-8)
Such a thing is not possible in the framework of a
materialistic world view. The Islamic world view opens up an infinite
vista before man''s eye, and compensates his ephemeral losses with lasting
benefits.
Apart from transforming human criteria through a
transcendental world view, Islam offers a specific system of training for
nourishing man''s various spiritual, moral and emotional potentialities
which lie latent in his being. Islam takes into consideration the welfare
of both the individual and society, based as it is on a spiritual
understanding and moral sense of life. Other systems either sacrifice the
individual for society or society for the individual, and as a result they
paralyze man''s nature and expose social life to severe complications and
perils.
Here, at the end of his introduction, the author spells
out his objective, which is a comparative study of the philosophical
viewpoints of Islam and other schools which confront it. Since the
capitalist system lacks any philosophical basis, he proposes to examine in
detail the philosophical foundations of dialectical materialism.
Part One: The Theory of Knowledge
(Chapter I):
Concepts:
The first chapter in this section is devoted to the
epistemological problem of the source of concepts and judgements. First
the author examines the Platonic doctrine of Recollection, then the
rationalist theory, and following that the empirical theory.
The Platonic theory is false because soul does not exist
in an abstract form prior to the existence of the body, being the result
of substantial motion in matter. It is by means of this movement that it
acquires an immaterial existence not characterized by material qualities
and free from the laws of matter.
The rationalist theory that some concepts are innate or a
priori is not refutable if interpreted to mean that innate ideas exist in
the soul potentially, becoming actual as the soul develops.
The empirical theory, first propounded by John Locke,
holds that there are no innate ideas; all our ideas without exception are
derived from experience. It was adopted by Marxism. However, the empirical
theory as admitted by Hume fails to explain how we form such concepts as
that of causality; for that which is derived from the senses is
succession, not causality. The rejection of the principle of causality by
empiricists does not solve the difficulty, because the fact remains that
we do conceive causality, which is not given in sense perception.
Al-Sadr then goes on to the Abstraction theory
(nazariyyat al-''intiza'') favoured by the Islamic philosophers in
general. According to this theory, concepts are of two kinds: primary and
secondary. The primary ones are products of sense-perception. The
secondary ones are produced from the primary concepts by the mind through
the means of ''abstraction.'' The secondary concepts although derived from
the primary ones transcend them and are the inventions of the mind.
Judgements:
Moving from concepts to judgements, al-Sadr selects here
the rational and empirical theses about the source of judgements for
discussion.
1. According to the rationalists, knowledge (in the form
of judgements or propositions) consists of two kinds. The first kind is
primary, self-evident, and intuitive. It includes such propositions as the
principle of contradiction, and such statements as ''The whole is greater
than the part'', ''One is half of two'', ''A thing cannot have contradictory
attributes at the same time'', and so on. The other kind is what the author
calls ''theoretical'' knowledge, whose truth cannot be established except in
the light of the first kind. Among the examples given are: ''The earth is
spherical'', ''Heat is caused by motion'', ''Infinite regress is impossible'',
''The angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles''.
The author does not seem to be right here in putting two
different kinds of statements in one class called ''theoretical knowledge''.
''The earth is spherical'' is not the same kind of judgement as ''The angles
of a triangle are equal to two right angles''. The former requires
observation and inference for its proof, while the latter can be
established by pure reasoning. The same distinction applies to the two
statements ''Heat is caused by motion'' and ''Infinite regress is
impossible''.
All knowledge is based on previous knowledge, which in
turn depends on knowledge preceding it. The a priori or primary knowledge
is that irreducible remainder which does not arise from any previous
knowledge. A part of primary knowledge, consisting of such general
principles as the law of contradiction, constitutes the basic condition of
all knowledge. Without it no general proposition can be affirmed.
It is this knowledge independent of experience that makes
metaphysics possible.
The progression of thought is from universal to more
particular propositions. This is true even in the experimental sciences,
which cannot dispense with the universal principles of causality and
uniformity of nature. Experimentation also, without the application of
necessary rational laws, does not lead to general scientific truths. The
Islamic philosophers, including al-Sadr, espouse this theory.
2. According to the empiricists sense experience is the
primary source of all knowledge. They do not admit the existence of any
necessary rational knowledge prior to experience. There can be no
knowledge of universal truths prior to experience. Their position makes
metaphysics and deduction impossible.
The empirical doctrine has to be rejected for the
following four reasons.
First, either the empirical doctrine is prior
to experience or it is not. If it is, it refutes itself. If it is derived
from experience, the validity of experience as a criterion of knowledge
has not yet been established.
Second, empiricism fails to affirm the existence of
matter and the external world, which cannot be affirmed except by primary
rational knowledge. Thus the metaphysical realities are not the only ones
which depend for their affirmation on the rational method.
Third, experience by itself is not sufficient to assert
the impossibility of anything. All that experience can affirm is non
presence or at the most non-existence. The notion of impossibility can be
accepted only on rational grounds, not on the basis of experience. If the
notion of impossibility is denied, anything, including contradiction,
becomes possible. The possibility of contradiction leads to the collapse
of all knowledge and science.
Fourth, the principle of causality cannot be demonstrated
by the means of the empirical doctrine. All that experience can affirm is
succession and contiguity, not causal necessity.
The author then turns to the effort of Hume to show how
the ''feeling'' of necessary connection implicit in the concept of causality
arises from experience: the theory of association of ideas. According to
Hume, the habit of leaping forward to and expecting the sequent associated
with the antecedent becomes so ingrained by continual repetition of their
conjunction as to make the mind feel that when the one event occurs the
other simply must follow it. Events so habitually conjoined and associated
as to be accompanied by this feeling of must are called cause and effect,
and the relation of simple sequence is turned into one of causation.
Al-Sadr offers five reasons for rejecting this
explanation. First, if it were true, no scientist would be able to confirm
a causal relation between two things in a single experiment, where there
is no repetition of the conjoined events to produce the feeling of
necessity. Similarly, many times, belief in a causal relationship is not
strengthened by further repetition of events involving a cause and its
effect.
Second, when we take the associated ideas of two events
regarded as being in cause-effect relationship, is the relation between
these two ideas that of mere conjunction or necessity? If it is mere
conjunction, the element of necessity implied in their association is not
explained.
Third, the necessity of the principle of causality is not
a psychological necessity but an objective one.
Fourthly, the mind distinguishes between cause and effect
even when they are completely conjoined (e.g. the movements of the pen and
the hand while writing).
Fifthly, it often happens that two events are frequently
associated without producing the belief that one of them is the cause of
the other (e.g. day and night). Empiricism cannot provide the basis for
the sciences, which are based on some rational principles that are not
subject to experimentation, viz., the principle of causality, the
principle of harmony between cause and effect, and the principle of non
contradiction. The scientist, in framing his theories, passes from these
general principles to particular hypothesis through a process of
syllogistic reasoning.
Of course, experience has a high value, but it itself
stands in need of a rational criterion. This criterion is primary rational
knowledge.
The rational theory of knowledge also explains the
quality of necessity and certainty that distinguishes the propositions of
mathematics from the propositions of the natural sciences. This is because
mathematics is entirely based on primary rational principles. Some
empiricists have tried to explain this difference by stating that
mathematical propositions are analytic (tautological). Yet even
mathematical statements would not be certain had it not been for their
reliance on certain rational principles, such as the law of contradiction.
Moreover, all mathematical statements are not analytic, such as, ,The
diameter is shorter than the circumference''.
How does primary knowledge emerge when it is not present
at birth and in all men at all times? The answer is that the primary
judgements proceed from the innermost being of the soul after it has
formed the necessary conceptions, directly or indirectly, as a result of
experience. As the soul develops through substantial movement, the primary
knowledge, which exists in it potentially, becomes actual.
The Marxist Theory of
Knowledge:
Here, the statement of the Marxist position by the author
is, unfortunately, not based either on the original works of Marx or
Engels or their authoritative interpreters. Perhaps due to the
non-availability of translations, he bases his criticism on the writings
of second-rate interpreters, such as Mao Tse-tung. The result is that the
Marxist position stated is weak, weakening in turn somewhat the author''s
criticism of Marxist epistemology.
According to Marxism, all knowledge begins in experience.
