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certain benefits and harms underlie the causes of religious precepts, which are
meant to achieve those benefits and are therefore subordinate to objective
benefits and harms, like an effect subordinate to its cause. The benefits
are facts and commands and prohibitions are based on conventions and norms. But
the benefits and harms from which the commands and prohibitions stem are not
permanent, for they are facts. Thus when the former are not permanent the
latter also will not be permanent. The objection to the eternity of moral
values takes another form in accordance with this argument. Now
we wish to make a fundamental examination of ethical criteria and confine our
discussion to ethics in our own special sense. The question of religious
precepts requires a wide-ranging study and has many ramifications pertaining to
worship, social and financial issues and other matters. In
the sphere of ethics, one may maintain that moral values are permanent on the
basis that moral values are identical with reality, in the sense that a moral
act is good because it is essentially attributed with the quality of goodness.
The immoral act is bad because it is attributed with the quality of badness.
Hence every act is either essentially moral or essentially immoral, although it
may be said that there are some acts which are neither essentially moral nor
immoral. It means that moral goodness and evil are objective qualities of
things inherent in their essences, and that which is essential is not mutable.
That which is morally good is good forever and that which is immoral will
always remain immoral. We should do that which is morally good and refrain from
that which is immoral, and this is a self-evident and indisputable judgement of reason. This is one of the arguments that may
be offered in favour of the permanence of ethical values. Such an
argument is based on the essential character of good and evil which are considered
as objective attributes. Muslim
philosophers have not discussed this issue but they do not believe in good and
evil as being inherent in things. In logic, they consider any reference to
morality or immorality as reference to popular convention which finds use only
in dialectics and rhetoric. They even point out that morals vary with nations
and they cite the example of Indians who consider slaughter of animals as
immoral. However they do not elaborate and do not explain why the notions of
moral goodness and evil cannot be employed in rational arguments. They do not
explain why they are different from mathematical propositions and what
criterion underlies this distinction. They only say that morality or immorality
pertain to the rules of practical reason. However it is clear that practical
reason develops such notions in order to achieve certain goals. In any case
they have not elaborated upon this matter.
Origins of Normative Notions
Among
philosophers Allamah Tabataba'i
has treated this issue more thoroughly than anyone else. In the sixth chapter
of his book Usul-e falsafeh
wa ravishe realism,
he has discussed profoundly this issue, which is related partly to philosophy
in that it explains the process of development of ideas by the mind. However,
the greater part of this discussion relates to jurisprudence (ilm al-usul). There he has
discussed the origin and character of the development of normative ideas, and
this topic deserves to be studied in greater depth and thoroughness. However,
here I will give a brief summary of his ideas relating to this discussion. He
begins by asserting that one of the functions of the mind is that it abstracts
certain ideas from external objects (an operation that does not involve any
innovation) then applies them to another reality, that is, it applies the
definition of one thing to another thing. In technical and literary terms, it
invents metaphors. A metaphor, especially in accordance with Sakkaki's view, is not simply the use of a word in some
other meaning. It does not simply
involve applying, for instance the word lion,' after divesting of its meaning,
to a person with a similar quality. No. A metaphor involves a change in meaning
not a change in word. Actually what we do is that we see, for instance, Zayd as an instance of the meaning of lion,' then we apply
the word lion' to him. This is a kind of innovation of the mind. The late Ayatullah Burujerdi would make an
interesting remark in this relation. He would say that when we say, "I saw
a lion shooting', this statement is actually composed of the two following
statements: "I saw Zayd shooting," and
"Zayd is like a lion." He agreed with Sakkaki's conception of the metaphor. Such
is Allamah Tabatabai's
notion of the mind's capacity to formulate
and invent concepts by supposing - not arbitrarily but in accordance with a
certain basis - one thing as an instance of another thing. Another
observation that he makes (though I do not agree with its generalization) is
that the difference between animals on one hand and plants and inanimate things
on the other is that the latter move towards their end in one predetermined
direction alone. Nature, in the course of its normal movement, is equipped with
means through which it moves inexorably towards its goal. Animals also, in
respect of their physical and natural being (not as beings possessing cognition
and mind), like plants move directly towards their end in the natural world.
But in their case, in most of their activities, the means of nature do not
suffice to direct animals towards their goals. That is why they employ their
mental and cognitive faculties to achieve their ends and in fact there emerges
a kind of harmony between physical nature (which is unconscious) and the mind
which functions in a manner enabling nature to achieve its ends. The mind is
however directed to achieving a series of ends which are supposed to be
different from the ends of nature and one imagines that the harmony between the
two is accidental. The
cognitive nature of man and animal is such that when they perceive and conceive
an object there arises a desire and appetite for it as [an expectation of]
pleasure in attaining it and of pain in the failure to attain it. This is
followed by the motive to obtain the pleasure or to avoid the pain. For
instance, man feels hunger and with his past experience of the pleasure in
eating food he seeks food in order to obtain that pleasure. But at the same
time in the process of this act nature too attains its end, for the body needs
food in order to replace the materials it has consumed. Eating serves both the
ends, the conscious purpose of pleasure is attained and at the same time nature
also satisfies its need. Hence, the question arises: Are these two acts
unconnected with each other and is their coincidence something accidental? Is
it possible for the case to be otherwise, that is, a person might feel pleasure
in eating stones while his stomach requires some other food? Is it an accident
that delicious foods which bring pleasure to one who eats also helps satisfy
the nature's needs? Or is it the case that there is no accident involved here
and there exists a kind of harmony between the two, where one is primary and
the other is secondary? In case there is no accident involved here, is the
conscious desire to obtain pleasure and to avoid pain the primary principle
which requires an apparatus that may cooperate with it for the end of pleasure
by digesting food and absorbing nourishing substances? Or is the case quite the
inverse and it is nature which constitutes the primary principle, having
subjugated the conscious mind to its service. Undoubtedly, there is some kind
of harmony between the natural and conscious ends. Hence every animal takes
pleasure in what nature needs and nature also needs that which brings pleasure.
For instance, a woman is equipped with organs and glands required for child
bearing and nursing and she finds pleasure in these acts. The animal that lays eggs takes pleasure in that act, and an animal
that gives birth takes pleasure in that
act as well. There exists a strong harmony between them. It is wrong to think that purposive movement is
confined to conscious beings only. When it is said that nature has certain
ends, some people may raise doubts as to whether unconscious nature may have
ends. In fact ends are related to that very unconscious nature and the
conscious mind has ends which are incidental to the ends of nature. The end of
nature is to move towards its perfection. As remarked by Ibn
Sina, the possession of consciousness does not make
purposive a being that lacks purpose. Purposiveness
is related to the essence of a thing. Sometimes a thing is aware of its end and
sometimes it is not. Q:
There is not always a harmony between pleasure and natural need. Many pleasures
are harmful for nature and injurious to its perfection. A:
Deviant cases are not to be taken into consideration, particularly in the case
of human being who act according to reason. What I mean is that there is a
general harmony that exists to such an extent that it cannot be accidental.
Exceptional cases, like that of the sick person who needs medicine without
feeling any pleasure in taking it, arise out of a kind of difference between
two exigencies, a topic which has its own details. An animal takes pleasure in
eating its medicine because it acts according to instinct, while the human
being, who acts according to his reason, does not take pleasure in it. Allamah Tabataba'i says that the
world of normative concepts begins here. The way he explains the issue it
appears as if all animate beings including man and animals possess such ideas.
But I do not agree with this generalization. According to him there is a
necessary relation between nature and ends, like the concrete, objective and
philosophical relation between cause and effect. Now in the world of conception
man takes the objective relation of necessity - as opposed to the relation of
contingency - between two things in nature and applies that relation to two
things between which there is no such real relation. For example, he applies
the term lion' to a brave man. Here, too, man applies the term necessity' as
found in external nature to the relation between himself and his goal. Such
necessities and oughts created by the mind, arise out
of such conceptions. The Allamah is of the view that
such oughts exist in every voluntary act and in every
conscious animal. The
earlier Muslim philosophers did not believe in such an ought or imperative.
They only held that man first conceives the benefit in something, then there
arises a desire for it, followed by a resolution. They described its various
stages stating that first there is conception followed by a judgement
of the benefit. This judgment in their view posits something objective, that
is, a certain object has a certain benefit. The final stage is the stage of
volition. However, they did not believe that a normative judgement
was involved here. But
Allamah Tabataba'i holds
that such a conception and imperative is involved here and the statement that
something is good has no other meaning. When we say that it is good to do
something, its goodness' arises from here. There is another issue involved
here as to whether good' arises out of ought' or the case is the reverse. As
the Allamah holds that ought' is the first
formulation (i'tibar), he holds that good'
arises from it. "It is good to do so" signifies a kind of inclination
towards something and it is as if one were attributing objective and concrete
qualities to human actions.
Theory of Employment
Then
he has some other views to which he repeatedly refers in his exegesis of the
Holy Qur'an, Al-Mizan,
and in other places. He holds that one of the normative formulations is that of
employment' (istikhdam). To explain, man has
a certain relation to his limbs and faculties and this relation is objective,
real and concrete. My hands are at my service. All bodily organs of man are
owned by man and form an integral part of his being and are really at the
service of man. He says that every external object may take the form of a tool
in the service of man, and in the same way that his hands belong to him he
considers other objects as his own. This kind of extension is typical of subjective formulations. (i'tibar). Man extends the boundaries of that which is
limited to his existence to other beings. He considers such a human tendency to
extend concepts as something instinctive. Then he adds that this kind of
conceptual attitude is not limited to inanimate objects, plants, etc.; rather
man views even other human beings from the viewpoint of employment.' Man is
created an exploiter and this is a natural tendency in him. He accepts social
and moral issues as secondary principles. However, in this chapter he does not
discuss this issue in detail but he does so in his exegesis, Al-Mizan, under verse 2:213, "Mankind were a
single nation". Perhaps there is apparently a contradiction in his
statements in different places. At one place he says that employment' is a
natural principle and that social justice is at the same time natural to man
but is modified by the other natural principle. Sometimes in his exegesis he is
explicit that man is not social by nature but social by adaptation. In the
sixth chapter of his Usul-e falsafeh wa ravish-e realism,
he states that man is social by nature, but what he means is by adaptation, as
mentioned by him elsewhere. So he does not hold that man is social by nature.
His socialization is outcome of the result of equilibrium between two opposite
instincts. His statements appear in this regard to be similar to the views of
contemporary evolutionists and Darwinians who believe the struggle for survival
to be fundamental in man. The
principle of employment is a respectable form of the Darwinian idea, for
according to it struggle for survival constitutes the basis of the human being
and cooperation arises out of struggle. Man struggles for survival, but the
enemy is not always of one kind; when several men face a common enemy and feel
that they cannot defeat him individually, cooperation is the only way to
survival. Here cooperation is like political treaties between states, meant
only to deter the common enemy. In fact such cooperation arises out of
struggle. Hence when there is no more a common enemy, conflict begins among
apparent friends. Again after some time differences arise within the dominating
group and grow into a war among them. If finally there remain only two
individuals they fight against each other until the fittest survives. If
we trace the roots of moral rules on cooperation, friendship, and unity, they
will be seen to stem from conflict. The implication is that if you want to
survive in your confrontation with the enemy (whether it is nature or something
else) you should be honest, truthful and so on. This is the viewpoint of the
evolutionists, and the Allamah's ideas lead to such
a conclusion, though he does not say so explicitly. Q: Does man have a natural inclination towards evil? A:
That is what it means. However, evil is relative, and from the viewpoint of the
individual it is good. Every individual has a natural tendency to seek his own
good, which makes him treat others as tools (such is the Allamah's
view). Man cannot refrain from treating others as tools. Q:
Struggle for survival is not the same as employment.' Sometime they may
coincide and sometimes not. A:
I did not say that the two concepts are identical. What I mean is that both of
them lead to the same conclusion. When we say that every individual tries to
treat others as his tools and to use them, when such a tendency is universal it
will automatically lead to conflict. The
Allamah continues his discussion on normative
formulations and most of it has greater relevance to jurisprudence than to
ethical philosophy and its relevant part was that which we have described. He
further holds that man formulates the oughts and
ought nots to attain certain ends. Since these ends
are transient, precepts and laws will also be subject to change and as long as
those ends remains the ought will remain as well, and when the end changes, the
ought will also change. Thus the Allamah holds that
normative conceptions, unlike objective conceptions, are transitory and
impermanent and almost concludes that moral values cannot be eternal.
Nevertheless, it is to be pointed out that he maintains that there are certain
normative principles which are immutable, which are five or six and these are
permanent and the rest of them are subject to change. The principles which he
regards as permanent are not of much relevance here, like the principle of
necessity in general, the principle of employment and other similar things
whose discussion will be fruitless here.
and Natural Urge
An
explanation that is necessary here is that his application of the principle of
employment to all animate beings is not acceptable. In my footnotes to the
chapter I have discussed the issue in a manner which does not assume such a
generalization. It is not even true of man in all his voluntarily acts but only
of some of his voluntarily actions which are performed thoughtfully. It is here
that the issues of moral imperative and the rational character of what is moral
and immoral arise. The acts of immature persons, like infants taking milk, are
rather derived from instinct. Elsewhere I have drawn a distinction between urge
and will. The animal, contrary to what is said loosely that an animal is that
