Zawahir alQuran [Electronic resources] : The Authority of the Book s Literal Meanings نسخه متنی

In the
Name of Allah, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Zawahir al-Qur'an: The Authority of the Book's Literal
Meanings

by Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khui

Translated from the Arabic by Mujahid Husayn

Indeed we have struck
for the people in this Qur'an every manner of similitude; haply they will
remember.(39:27)

Truly it is the revelation of the Lord of all
Being, brought down, by the Trustworthy Spirit upon thy heart in a clear
Arabic language, that thou mayest be one of the
warners.(26:192-195)

This is an exposition for mankind, and a
guidance and admonition for the God-fearing. (3: 138)

Thus have We
made it easy on your tongue, that haply they may remember.
(44:58)

And We have made the Qur'an easy for remembrance. Is there
anyone that will remember? (54: 17)

And what, do they not
contemplate over the Qur'an? And had it been from someone other than God,
they would have found in it much inconsistency.
(4:82)
Apart from these verses, there are other verses as well which
prove the obligatoriness (wujub) of acting in accordance with the
contents of the Qur'an and the necessity of accepting the literal meanings of
its verses.
Following arguments prove the authoritativeness (hujjiyyah)
of the literal meanings of the Qur'an as comprehended by the Arabs:
The Qur'an's revelation as a proof of prophethood and the Prophet's (S)
challenge to all mankind to bring a single surah of its kind, both
imply that the Arabs used to understand the literal meaning of the Qur'an.
Had the Qur'an spoken in riddles, it wouldn't have been correct to challenge
them regarding it, nor its miraculous character would have been proved to
them, because they could not have understood it. It would have also
contradicted the purpose for which the Qur'an was revealed and its
invitation to mankind to believe in it.
There are ample traditions commanding adherence to 'the two Weighty
Things' (al-Thaqalayn, which are the Qur'an and the Ahl al- Bayt,) that the
Prophet (S) left behind for the Muslims. Here, evidently, the meaning of
adhering to the Qur'an is to grasp its message and to act in accordance with
it, and there is no other meaning apart from this.
There are mutawatir traditions (i.e. traditions narrated by so
many different chains of transmission as to establish their authenticity
beyond doubt) which order that traditions be checked against the Qur'an;
those which contradict it should be rejected as invalid or false, as those
whose acceptance is prohibited, because they are not the words of (the
Prophet [8]

or) the Imams (A). These traditions categorically prove the
canonical authority of the literal meanings of the Qur'an, i.e. the meanings
as understood by the ordinary speakers of the language familiar with the
literary (fasih) Arabic language. To this category also belong those
traditions which order the correlation of contractual conditions with the
Qur'an and rejection of those opposing it.
The arguments of the Imams (A) regarding some rules of the Shari'ah, as
well as other things, in which they have argued by applying the verses of
the Qur'an. Following are some examples:
a. There is the exposition of al-'Imam al-SAdiq (A) when
Zurarah questioned him, "How do you understand that mash (the
ritual wiping, of the head or the feet during wudu') of (only) a
part of the head is required?" The Imam (A) replied, "From the ba',
"in the verse: wamsahu bi ru'sikum

b. Another example, is
his prohibiting Hisham al-Dawaniqi from accepting a slanderer's report,
because such a person is a fasiq (evildoer), and the Qur'an says:
If an ungodly (fasiq) person comes to you with a tiding. verify it.
(49:6)

c. Among the arguments is his (A) warning a person who
had prolonged his stay in the toilet to listen to prohibited music, on the
excuse that he had not intentionally come for listening to it, by
observing, "Have you not heard the words of God Almighty Surely the
hearing and sight and the heart will all be questioned?"
(17:36)

d. Another instance is the Imam's telling his (A) son,
Isma'il "When believers give evidence before you, endorse its verify ,"
quoting as a proof the verse: He (the Prophet {S) believes in God and
believes the believers.(9:61)

e. Concerning the validity of a
slave being a muhallil for a woman divorced thrice, he (A)
observes: "He is considered (fit to be) a husband, and God Almighty says
in the Qur'an: ...Unless she marries another husband
"(2:230)

f. Another such argument is where the Imam (A)
observes that a triple divorcee will not become halal again (for
the husband who divorces her) through a temporary marriage (mut'ah
), because God Almighty says: Thus if he divorces her, there is no
blame on the two if they reunite.(2:230) And there is no divorce in
mut'ah.

g. Similarly, concerning a person who had tripped
and lost a nail and then bandaged the toe, he (A) said: " A person's duty
in this and other similar instances is known from the Qur'an, which
declares: God has not ordained any hardship for you in the
religion."(22:78) Then he (A) said: "Perform the mash over it"
(the bandage).

h. The Imam (A) brings proof regarding the
permissibility of marriage with a certain woman by quoting this verse from
the Qur'an: And other than those mentioned (as prohibited) have been
made halal for you. (4:24)

i. Of such arguments is the one of
the Imam (A) concerning the validity of a slave's marriage, because the
Qur'an says: An owned slave having no authority over anything.
(16:75)

j. The Imam (A) cites the following verse from the
Qur'an as a proof of the permissibility of (eating the flesh of) certain
species of animals: Say: 'I do not find in that which has been
revealed to me anything forbidden for an eater to eat.'(6
145)
There are many other similar arguments of the Imams (A) that are
based on Qur'anic verses, and these are scattered through the different
chapters of fiqh and other subjects.
Arguments against the authority of the Zawihir:

A group
of traditionists have rejected the authority of the literal meanings of the
Qur'an, refusing to act on them for following reasons:
1. The understanding of the Qur'an is limited to a selected
few: They argue that the ability to understand the Qur'an is limited to
those who have been addressed by it. The protagonists of this view rely as
their proof on a number of traditions concerning this issue, such as the
mursal tradition of Shu'ayb ibn Anas narrated from al-'Imam al-Sadiq
(A), reporting that the Imam (A) said to Abu Hanifah: Are you the faqih
of the people of Iraq?" He replied: "Yes, I am." The Imam (A) said: "On what
basis do you pronounce your fatwa for them?" He replied: '.On the basis of
the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Prophet." The Imam said: "0 Abu
I:lanlfah, do you comprehend the Qur'an the way it should be comprehended,
and do you recognize the nasikh and the mansukh?" He replied, .'Yes." The
Imam (A)said. "0 Abu Hanlfah, you certainly profess having knowledge! Woe to
you! God has not kept this knowledge except with the people of the Book and
they on whom it has been sent down (i.e. the Ahl al-Bayt). Woe to you! This
knowledge is with none except the chosen of our Prophet's (S) progeny, and
God has not bequeathed a word to you from His Book.

The
following tradition is narrated by Zayd al-Shahhaim in this relation:
Qatadah visited Abu Ja'far (A) and the Imam (A) asked him: " Are you the
faqih of the people of Basrah ? " He replied: "This is what they think. "
The Imam (A) then said: "I have come to know that you expound (tufassiru)
the Qur'an.'I He replied: "Yes, I do." (The tradition continues until where)
the Imam (A) said ;"0 Qatadah, if you have expounded the Qur'an in
accordance with your own views, then you have certainly perished and have
also caused others to perish, and if you have expounded it in accordance
with the views of others, then you have perished and have caused others to
perish. Woe to you! No one knows the Qur'ann except those who have been
addressed by it."

Answer: The meaning of these and similar
traditions is that the comprehension of the Qur'an mentioned in them implies
comprehending it completely, knowing both its literal and hidden meanings,
along with its nasikh and mansukh, and this is limited to
those who have been addressed by it. The first tradition explicitly conveys
this meaning. Thus the question asked in this tradition was about the full
comprehension of the Qur'an and about differentiating between the nasikh
and the mansukh. The Imam's (A) censure of Abu Hanifah was due to
his claim of possessing that knowledge. As to the second tradition, it
contains the word 'tafsir' which means 'unveiling' (kashf
al-qina'), and therefore it does not include the acceptance of literal
meanings, because they are not concealed so as to require unveiling. This is
also borne out by the explicit traditions mentioned earlier that
understanding of the Qur'an is not limited to the Infallible Imams (A).
Moreover the Imam's statement in the mursal tradition (of Shu'ayb ibn
Anas) in which he says (God Almighty has not bequeathed to you a word from
His Book), also proves the same, for it means that God has chosen the
Awsiya' (A) of His prophet (S) for inheriting the Qur'an, and this is the
meaning of the verse: Then We bequeathed the Book on those of Our
servants We chose (35. 32)

Therefore. the knowledge of the
Qur'an's reality is exclusively with the Imams (A) and others do not have a
share in it. This is the meaning of the mursal tradition (of Shu'ayb
ibn Anas) ; otherwise, would it be reasonable to think that Abu Hanifah did
not comprehend anything of the Qur'an including. Qul Huwallahu
Ahadand other similar other verses which are explicit in their meaning?
There is really a very large number of traditions which prove that such
complete knowledge is particular to the Imams (A), and some of them have
been mentioned earlier.

2. The prohibition of tafsir bi
al-ra'y: It is argued that the acceptance of the Qur'an's meanings is
tantamount to tafsir bi al-ra'y (interpreting the Qur'an according to
subjective opinion), and there are mutawatir traditions, narrated
both by Sunnis and Shi'ah, which forbid such a
practice.

Answer: As said, 'tafsir' implies unveiling,
and this does not include the taking of literal meanings of the verses,
because such a meaning is not something hidden that has to be uncovered.
Moreover, even if we I should consider this as tafsir, it is not
tafsir bi al-ra'y for it to come in the purview of the
mutawatir traditions forbidding it. On the contrary, it is a
tafsir in accordance with the common usage of words. Therefore, one
who, for example, translates a sermon of Nahj al-balaghah in
accordance with the ordinarily understood meanings of its words and by using
the indications available in the sermon and outside it, his doing so will
not be considered tafsir bi al-ra'y , and al-'Imam al-Sadiq (A)
points this out when he says: "People have solely perished on account of the
mutashabih, because they could not comprehend its meaning and
reality, interpreting its meaning in accordance with their views and seeking
thereby to relieve themselves of the need to ask the Awsiya', who could have
informed them." It is probable that the meaning of tafsir bi al-ra'y
is independence from referring to the Imams (A) in giving fatwa,
although they are companions to the Qur'an in regard to the obligation of
adherence to the two and as the ultimate authority.

Therefore, if a
person acts in accordance with the general statements (al-'umum ) of
the Qur'an without accepting the views of the Imams (A) in determining and
limiting (taqyid and takhsis) the jurisdiction of these
statements, it will be considered as tafsir bi al-ra'y. On the whole,
the adoption of literal meanings after a due search for internal and
external indications (qara'in) present in the Qur'an and the
traditions, or for a rational proof, can not only be not considered
tafsir bi al-ra'y, it cannot be considered 'tafsir' as such.
As mentioned earlier, the aforementioned traditions indicate that the Qur'an
should be referred to and acted upon, and it is evident that such reference
implies the acceptance of its literal meanings. Accordingly, when the
relevant traditions are reconciled, tafsir bi al-ra'y ought to be
understood as implying something other than acting in accordance with the
literal meanings.

3. The mystery of the meanings of the
Qur'an: It is said that the Qur'an contains sublime and mysterious
meanings and this quality of it is a hurdle in comprehending its meanings
and fully grasping its import. To be certain, there are some books of the
ancients whose meanings cannot be comprehended except by knowledgeable
experts; accordingly, how could the Qur'an, which contains all the knowledge
regarding both the past and the future, be understood?

Answer:
It is true that the Qur'an certainly contains the knowledge of the past and
the future, and comprehending it from the Qur'an is doubtlessly restricted
to the Ahl al-Bayt (A). However, this does not contravene the fact that the
Qur'an has literal meanings understandable by anyone acquainted with the
Arabic language and its rules, which one may act upon once they become clear
after due research for supporting indications.

4. The knowledge
that the literal meaning is not intended: It may be said that we know in
a mujmal way (i.e. without knowing all the specific details) that
there exist restrictive proofs (mukhassisat and muqayyidat)
which limit the application of the general statements (umumat
and itlaqat) of the Qur'an. This means that some of its literal
meanings are certainly not what are intended, for such general
statements have been restricted in their jurisdiction. However, those
literal meanings which are not intended are not specifically known so
as to enable us to confine us to those particular instances. As a
result of this, all the literal meanings of the Qur'an and all its
general statements become indistinct (mujmal) incidentally,
though they are not in fact such essentially. Consequently, it is not valid
to act according to them, as a measure of caution against acting in
violation of the real ( commands of God).

Answer: This
mujmal knowledge (that there are some general statements whose
literal meaning is not the intended one) can act as a hindrance to accepting
all the literal meanings when one resolves to act in accordance with them
without a due investigation regarding their real import. But after the
mukallaf (a person responsible for his religious duties) investigates
and discovers such instances to the extent of gaining a mujmal
knowledge of their presence in the Qur'an, the hindrance posed by the prior
mujmal knowledge is removed, and it fails to have any
effect.

Thereupon, there remains no hindrance to acting upon the
literal meanings. The same thing is true of the Sunnah, where we also know
that there are proofs which limit the jurisdiction of its general
statements. Hence, had the mujmal knowledge (regarding the
zawahir of the Qur'an) been a hindrance in the way of accepting its
literal meanings even after such knowledge is rendered ineffective, it would
also be a hindrance in accepting the literal meanings of traditions. Not
only that, it would stop us from applying the Rule of Bara'ah ( the
presumption of absence of duty) in situations where doubts concerning the
presence of a duty (al-shubuhat al-hukmiyyah) arise in the
obligatoriness (wujub ) or impermissibility (hurmah) of
something. This because every mukallaf knows in a mujmal way
the presence of compulsory duties in the Shari'ah, and this mujmal
knowledge (in accordance with the reasoning of the opponents of
zawahir) could result in applying caution (ihtiyat) in all
doubtful cases of duties pertaining to obligations and prohibitions.
However, we know for certain that caution is not wajib in them. It is
true that a large group of traditionists have considered caution
wajib in cases of doubts concerning the presence of prohibition
(al-shubuhat al-tahrimiyyah) because they imagined that the
traditions ordering restraint and caution prove restraint and caution in
cases of al-shubuhat al-tahrimiyyah. But this opinion of theirs is
not based on the mujmal knowledge regarding the presence of
compulsory duties in the Shari'ah, because if it were so they would have
considered caution obligatory in case of doubt regarding the obligatoriness
of something (al-shubuhat al-wujubiyyah) as well. However, as far as
we know, no one has considered caution compulsory in such cases. The sole
secret of caution not being wajib in these and other similar
instances is that mujmal knowledge is at times 'dissolved' as a
result of success in acquiring the knowledge (of specifics), and the
dissolution of the mujmal knowledge renders it ineffective. For a
further explanation, the reader should refer to our book Ajwad
al-taqrirat.

5. The prohibition of following the mutashabihat
: The opponents of acting on the zawahir point out that the
Qur'anic verses forbid the following of the mutashabihat. God
Almighty says: In it are muhkam (clear) verses which are the foundation
of the Book, and other verses which are mutashabih. As for those in whose
hearts is deviation, they follow its mutashabih (ambiguous)
verses.,.,(3:7) The term mutashabih also includes literal
meanings or, at least, the possibility of its including literal meanings
makes them incapable of being accepted as authority.

Answer:
The word mutashabih has a perspicuous meaning, and there is no
ambiguity or vagueness in it. It means a word having two or more meanings
that stand in the same degree of nearness in relation to that word. Thus
when such a word is used in a verse, the possibility arises that anyone of
these meanings may be actually intended. For this reason, it is wajib
to observe restraint in giving a judgment in favour of any of the meanings
unless there is an indication to specify it. Accordingly, a word having a
single literal meaning is not considered mutashabih.

If we
condescend to accept that the word mutashabih is itself ambiguous,
and that there exists a possibility of its including literal meanings, our
doing so does not prevent us from acting in accordance with the literal
meanings. This is after the practice of rational persons (sirat
al-'uqala') which sanctions the acceptance of the literal meaning of a
speech or writing. Therefore, a sole possibility is incapable of preventing
this practice from being acted upon, for it requires a categorical proof in
order to do so. Otherwise, this practice will undoubtedly be followed. For
this reason, a master is able to prove his servant's fault if the latter
acts against the literal meanings of the former's speech, and it is valid
for the master to punish him for the violation. Similarly, the servant may
justify himself vis-a-vis his master if he has acted in accordance with the
literal meaning of his master's words where it is opposed to his real
intent. On the whole, this practice is followed in accepting the literal
meanings, unless there exists a categorical proof against it.

6.
The occurrence of tahrif in the Qur'an:[1]

The occurrence
of tahrif (textual corruption, or loss) in the Qur'an prevents us
from accepting the literal meanings because a possibility of there being,
alongside the literal meanings, helping indications determining their real
intent exists, and these indications might have been lost due to
tahrif.

Answer: We reject the claim of occurrence of
tahrif in the Qur'an, and have earlier presented our argument
concerning it. There we said that the traditions commanding us to refer to
the Qur'an are by themselves a proof negating tahrif. Even if we
condescend to presume the occurrence of tahrif, we are obliged by
these traditions to act in accordance with the Qur'an - even after the
presumption of occurrence of tahrif. The conclusion that follows from
this discussion is that it is necessary to act on the literal meanings of
the Qur'an; that the Qur'an is the basis of the Shari'ah; and that the
narrated Sunnah will not be acted upon when it opposes the
Qur'an.
The Methodology of Tafsir: Tafsir ' means the
elucidation of the intent of God Almighty in the Holy Qur'an. Therefore, it is
neither permissible in this regard to rely on conjectures (zunun) or on
one's preferences (istihsan), nor on anything whose validity has not
been established by reason or the Shari'ah. This is because following
conjectures and attributing anything to God without His permission is
forbidden. God Almighty says:
Say: 'Has God permitted you, or do you forge a lie against
God?' (10:59)

And follow not that of which you have no knowledge.
(17:36)
There are other such verses and traditions that forbid acting
without knowledge, and there are a sufficiently large (mustafidah)
number of traditions from both Sunni and Shi'ah sources forbidding tafsir
bi al-ra'y. This makes it clear that it is not valid to follow the
tafsir of any exegete, irrespective of his being rightful in his creed
or otherwise, because it amounts to following conjecture, and conjecture is
not a substitute for knowledge.
The Sources of Tafsir: It is necessary for an exegete to:
follow the literal meanings as understood by a linguistically competent Arab
and we have already explained that literal meanings are authoritative), or
follow the dictates of sound reason, for reason is an inward authority in the
same way as the Prophet (S) is an outward authority (hujjah), or follow
the traditions established to have been narrated from the Ma'sumun ( the
Prophet [ S]

, Fatimah [ A]

, and the Imams [A]

), because they are the
authorities to be referred to in the religion (al-maraji' fi al-Din).
The Prophet (S) declared the duty of making recourse to them when he said:
Verily , I am leaving behind two weighty things amongst you:
the Book of God and my Family, my Ahl al-Bayt. If you hold on to them, you
will never go astray after me. [2]

There is no doubt that the statements of the Imams (A) are
established when narrated through a definite chain of transmission free from
doubt. Similarly, there is no doubt that they are not proved when narrated by
a weak (da'if) chain which does not possess the requirements of
credibility. Are their (A) statements proven through a chain creating
presumption (tariq zanni) when supported by a definite proof (dalil
qat'i)? The scholars differ in this regard.
A doubt is raised here concerning the authority of khabar
al-wahid (a tradition which is not mutawatir) narrated by
trustworthy narrators from the Ma'sum1in (A) regarding the tafsir of
the Qur'an. The reason offered is that the implication of the authority of
khabar al-wahid, or some other proof (dalil) leading to
presumption (zann), is that it is obligatory to follow it in a case
when one is ignorant about the actual law as if the law were known for
certain. Such an approach is applicable nowhere except in regard to a hadith
concerning a law of the Shari'ah or a subject relating to such a law. This
condition is at times not present in a khabar al-wahid narrated from
the Ma'sumun (A) in regard to tafsir (for such traditions may relate to
subjects having no relation whatsoever with the laws of the Shari'ah, such as
doctrines, historical events, etc.).
This objection is contrary to fact. It has been explained in
discussions on usul al-fiqh that the meaning of the authority
(hujjiyyah) of the proofs that bring only presumption (and not
certainty) about the actual fact, is that such presumptive proofs have been
made binding substitutes for definite proofs by the Lawgiver (this is called
certainty through ta'abbud, i.e. in observance of Divine sanction).
Thus, a channel whose credibility is approved by the Lawgiver's sanction is as
good as a source resulting in certainty, despite the tact that it lacks the
intrinsic capacity to produce certainty. Hence all the effects of certain
knowledge will follow from this channel, and it will be as correct to report
(regarding non-legal matters) on its authority as it is correct to do so on
the basis of actual knowledge; it will not be considered a statement without
knowledge.
We are led to this conclusion by the practice prevalent among all
reasonable persons ('uqala'). Such persons consider a channel of
approved credibility similar to actual knowledge, without making any
difference between the effects of the rule. For instance, the possession, of a
thing by someone is regarded as a proof of his ownership by the People,
despite the fact that it can give rise only to presumption that the Possessor
is its owner, and they allow on its basis all the effects of ownership, and
report - without deserving any blame - that he is the owner of that thing. And
this common practice has not been disapproved by the Lawgiver.
Of course, it is true that a trustworthy tradition - or any other
credible channel -should possess all the conditions of credibility. Among such
conditions is that the tradition should not be of known falsity, because
something known to be false cannot reasonably possess the marks of credibility
or enjoy the Lawgiver's sanction. Therefore, those traditions which are
contrary to consensus or definite Sunnah, or the Qur'an, or the dictates of
sound reason, will certainly not be considered credible, although they may
possess other requirements of credibility. There is also no difference here
between traditions relating to a rule of the Shari'ah and those relating to
non-legal subjects.
The basis of this argument against the credibility of khabar
al-wahid is that however trustworthy a narrator may be, the tradition
narrated by him is not secure from being contrary to the truth, because there
is at least a possibility of his having made a mistake, especially where there
are a large number of links in the chain of transmission. Hence, it is
necessary to have some grounds establishing credibility that remove such a
possibility , making it as if non-existent. However, in the case of certainty
about the falsity of a tradition, which is known to be contrary to the truth,
such a certainty cannot be evaded on the basis of the Law- giver's sanction
(ta'abbud), for the intrinsic quality of certainty is to reveal the
truth and its validity is established as necessary by reason.
Therefore it is necessary to limit the grounds of the credibility
of khabar al-wahid to those traditions which are not known to be false
or contrary to the truth. The same rule applies to other reliable channels of
information. This issue has a bearing upon many other issues of the kind, and
on it are based replies to many doubts and criticisms. The reader should
understand it well.
Limiting the Jurisdiction of the Qur'an by Khabar al-Wahid:
When the credibility of khabar al-wahid has been established by a
definite proof (dalil qat'i), is it possible to limit the
jurisdiction of the general statements of the Holy Qur'an by a khabar
al-wahid? The prevalent (mashhur) view among the scholars considers
it valid. A group of Sunni scholars opposes this view, and some of them reject
it uncondi-tionally. 'Isa ibn Aban states: "If a general statement of the
Qur'an has already been limited by a definite proof, it is valid to further
limit it by a khabar al-wahid; otherwise it is not valid." Al-Karkhi
states: "If the Book's general statement has been limited by a separate proof
(dalil munfasil) it is valid to limit it further by a khabar
al-wahid and not otherwise." Al-Qadi Abu Bakr has refrained from giving an
opinion in this regard. [3]

We accept the prevalent view, and the ground for doing so is, the
khabar al-wahid - as presumed - enjoys definite credibility, and this
implies that it is wajib to act according to it as long as there is no
hindrance to doing so.
Doubts and Opinions: The imagined hindrance to acting in
accordance with khabar al-wahid is not based on valid reasons. Some
main objections and the replies to them are mentioned below:
It is argued that the Holy Qur'an is the word of God Almighty which has
been revealed to His Noble Prophet (S) ; this is a definite fact and beyond
doubt. However, a khabar al-wahid has no certainty of being in
accordance with the truth, nor is there a guarantee of its contents being
the authentic word of the Ma'sum, because there is at least a possibility of
the narrator's mistake. In the light of this, it is not reasonable to
abandon a thing which is certain for a proof containing a possibility of
error.

The reply to this is that although the authenticity of the
Qur'an is definite, it is not certain whether its general statements
represent the actual law. It is obligatory to act in accordance with the
general statements because they are the literal meanings, and it is accepted
as a reasonable practice not disapproved by the Lawgiver to follow literal
imports. It is quite obvious that this common practice, which proves the
authority of literal meanings, is limited to cases where there exists no
indication (qarinah) contrary to the literal import, irrespective of
whether the indication is attached (muttasil) to the general
statement or is separate (munfasil) from it. Therefore, when there is
an indication conflicting with the literal import, it is obligatory to forgo
the literal meaning and to act in accordance with the indication. Hence
there is no other alternative to limiting the general statements of the
Qur'an by khabar al-wahid after a definite proof of its credibility.
It means that the khabar al-wahid has originated from the Ma'sum,
though its authenticity is based on ta'abbud and not on fact. In
other words, we may say, though the authenticity of the Qur'an is certain,
we have only presumption regarding its real intent, and there is no
reasonable impediment to forgoing a proof which gives presumption for
another similar proof whose credibility is known for certain.
It is argued that authentic traditions of the Ma'sumtin (A) command us
to compare the traditions with the Qur'an, and that those which oppose it
should be discarded and not considered their word. A limiting tradition
(al-khabar al-khass) conflicting with a general statement of the
Qur'an comes within the purview of such traditions; thus it becomes
obligatory to discard it as unauthentic.

The reply to this is that,
first, we should clarify the meaning of 'contradiction' and 'opposition.'
Customary indications applied in comprehending the intent of the Qur'an are
not considered by custom as opposing the Qur'an in any manner, and a
limiting proof (al-dalil al- khass) is an indication which elucidates
the intent of a general proof. Two statements contradict each other when
people are unable to understand from them the intent .of their speaker if
both the statements come from him. On this basis, a limiting khabar
al-wahid cannot be considered as contradicting a general statement of
the Qur'an; rather, it elucidates its intent.

This is also further
confirmed by our knowledge that a large number of traditions have been
issued by the Ma'sumun (A) that limit the general statements of the Qur'an.
Now, should this limiting be considered as contradiction to the Qur'an, the
following words of the Ma'sumun (A) will be incorrect: " That which
opposes the word of our Lord, has not been said by us. It is absurd or
false. "

This statement of them (A) proves that the limiting of
the jurisdiction of the general statements of the Qur'an does not involve
any contradiction. Furthermore, the Ma'sumun (A) have laid down agreement
with the Qur'an of one of two contradicting traditions as a criterion for
preferring one of them to the other. This implies, that a tradition which is
not in consonance with the literal general statements of the Qur'an is
creditable in itself, for it is obvious that if this tradition were opposed
to the Qur'an in a manner that reconciliation were impossible, it would fail
to be credible in itself, and thereby leave no room for conflict and
preference. Therefore, there is no alternative to accepting that the meaning
of a tradition 's not being in consonance with the Qur'an is that it is
possible to reconcile the two in an acceptable manner by limiting the
general Qur'anic statements.

The conclusion is that a tradition
limiting the general Qur'anic statements is in itself credible and it is
necessary to act in accordance with it, except when it is faced with another
tradition contradicting it.
It is argued that if it is valid to limit Qur'anic statements with
khabar al-wahid, it will also be valid to abrogate the Qur'an with
it. But since to do so is certainly not valid, it follows that limiting the
Qur'anic statements with it is also invalid. The basis of such a logical
linkage is that abrogation ( as explained in the chapter on naskh)
means limiting the Qur'anic statements with respect to a specific period of
time, which ends with the arrival of the abrogating proof (al-dalil
al-nasikh ). Consequently the abrogation of a Qur'anic statement does
not mean its actual annulment, but only a formal extrinsic abolition. The
limiting of the jurisdiction of general Qur'anic laws in regard to the
instances of its application is similar to limiting it to a particular
period, both being forms of limitation. Therefore, if the first is valid,
the second, too, would be valid.

The reply to this is that the
difference between the two forms of limitation is the presence of a definite
consensus (al- 'ijma' al-qat'i) prohibiting the abrogation of general
Qur'anic laws by khabar al-wahid and had it not been for this
ijma', the abrogation of Qur'anic statements by a trustworthy
khabar al-wahiid would have been as valid as the limiting of the
general jurisdiction of Qur'anic statements. We have mentioned earlier that
though the Qur'an enjoys definite authenticity of source (qat 'i
al-sanad), its actual import is not known for certain, and there is no
impediment to forgoing it by accepting a khabar al-wahid whose
credibility is definitely known.

It is to be noted that the
above-mentioned ijma' is not based on mere ta'abbud, but rests
on a rational basis. This is because some matters are such that should they
be true in external reality, they are bound to be widely reported
(mutawatir), and if a matter of great significance is reported only
by some, it is evidence of the falsity or error of the report. The proofs in
favour of the reliability of khabar al-wahid do not apply to such
reports. It is on this basis that we said that a text is not proved to be a
part of the Qur'an on the basis of khabar al-wahid. For there is no
doubt that the abrogation of the Qur'an is not an affair limited to a
particular group of Muslims to the exclusion of others. Hence, had
abrogation occurred, a very large number of traditions (akhbar
mutawatirah) would have narrated it. Now, if a single tradition reports
it, it will be the proof of its falsity or error. With this exposition, the
difference between the limitation of the Qur'anic statements by khabar
al-wahid and the abrogation of them by such traditions becomes obvious,
and the logical linkage claimed between the two is thereby refuted.
NOTES:

1. The author has discussed in
detail the issue of tahrif in this book (al-Bayan fi tafsir
al-Qur'an) in the chapter "siyanat al-Qur'an min al-tahrif" pp.
197-285.

2. For the Sunni sources containing Hadith
al-Thaqalayn, see: Musnad Ahmad ibn Hanbal, part iii, pp. 14, 17, 26, 59 from
Abu Sa'id al-Khudri; iv, pp. 366, 371 from Zayd ibn Arqam; v, pp. 182, 189
from Zayd ibn Thabit. See also al-Darimi, Sunan, "kitab fada'il
al-Qur'an, " ii, 431; al-Suyuti in al-Jami' al-saghir, from
al-Tabarani, from Zayd ibn Thabit, evaluates it as sahih; al-'Allamah
al-Manawi, Sharh, ii, p.15; al-Hakim, al-Mustadrak, iii, 109,
from Zayd ibn Arqam, evaluates it as sahih; al-Muttaqi al-Hindi,
Kanz al-'ummal, "bab al-'i'tisam bi al-Kitab wa al-Sunnah, "
Da'irat al-Ma'arif al-'Uthmaniyyah, i, 253, 332. Others who have reported it
are Muslim in his Sahih; Abu Ya'la, al-Hafiz Abd al-'Aziz ibn
al-'Akhdar, and many others. For a detailed study of its sources see Hamid
Husayn al-Hindi, 'Abaqt al-'anwar.

3. Al-'Amidi,
Usul al-'ahkam. ii, 472. Al-Tawhid Vol.VII, No.1, Muharram Rabi ul
Awwal, 1410 (August October 1989)

*The author, Ayatullah al-Uzma al-Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khui, is one of the
maraji' (legal authorities) of the Shi'i world and one of the most
eminent figures in the world of contemporary Islamic scholarship. The
translation given here is that of two chapters from his work on Qur'anic
exegesis, al-Bayan ti tafsir al- Qur'an : "hujjiyyat zawahir
al-Qur'an," (the ,authority of the Qur'anic zawahir), and "usul
al-tafsir" (the principles of exegesis).

Return to Holy Qur'an
Resources on the Internet Home Page